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1. Summary  
Consociationalism arrangements, a form of power-sharing, have been used in violently divided 
societies as a means to end wars and build peace. However, many deeply divided countries 
have struggled to implement their power-sharing arrangements and the transition to more 
‘normal’ politics is difficult. Research into reform of consociationalism arrangements in deeply 
divided societies is scarce and there is little focus or detail provided about the factors which 
affect the outcomes of these reforms. The few papers found on the subject are from academic 
sources. 
A paper by McCulloch (2017), which this report draws heavily upon as one of the only papers 
focusing specifically on this area, identifies several democratic, orderly and legal pathways from 
consociationalism in deeply divided societies, which will differ depending on timing and context. 
More details on the pathways are included in the first section of this report. The pathways 
identified by McCulloch (2017) include:     
 Power-sharing dissolution via politically initiated constitutional reforms: Recognition that 
there are issues to be resolved in the consociationalism arrangement can led to efforts at 
wholesale or incremental reform. Sometimes they arise as a result of consensus that a 
new agreement is needed and sometimes they result as a response to crisis or efforts to 
improve institutional functionality. Northern Ireland, for example, has made several 
institutional reforms, in response various issues that have arisen. Trust and willingness to 
cooperate between the parties involved is important for creating the support needed for 
reform, especially as opening up the constitutional framework can lead to uncertainty and 
anxiety. A major barrier to reform is the unwillingness of (ethnic/sectarian) political elites 
to give up power. 
 
 Power-sharing dissolution via judicial interventions: International and domestic courts 
have made rulings that tackle the terms of power-sharing agreements, especially in 
favour of the rights of individuals over consociationalism’s emphasis on group rights. 
Courts may be able to make difficult choices politicians are reluctant to make. However, 
such decisions can be problematic if they do not appreciate why consociationalism was 
adopted in the first place or get the timing of the transition wrong. They can also 
undermine the legitimacy of the agreement and the state. In addition, unless there is the 
political will to implement the suggested reforms, there is little that the courts can do, and 
politicians may be reluctant to make changes that would affect their power. Decisions 
made by the European Court for Human Rights, for example, have called for the reform 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s consociationalism arrangement but local politicians have 
not implemented these reforms.     
 
 Power-sharing adoption on an interim basis: Power-sharing agreements can establish 
that they are temporary from the beginning, either through aspirational claims to 
transition or with a binding sunset clause. This can help with confidence building between 
the parties but can contribute to instability if the deadline approaches and parties are 
nervous about their place in the new system, or to lack of progress if there is no specified 
end date. The lack of a clear road map in Lebanon’s Ta’if Agreement has meant that the 
transition has failed to move away from consociationalism and political leaders have 
been reluctant to reform a system which benefits them.  
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Of these pathways from consociationalism, McCulloch identifies constitutional tinkering, or 
adjustments to the original agreement over time approach (part of the power-sharing dissolution 
via politically initiated constitutional reforms), as the most promising pathway from 
consociationalism. Liberal, rather than corporate, forms of consociationalism may be more able 
to incorporate small changes over time.  
However, it should be noted that a major pathway from power-sharing is through the collapse of 
the arrangement, rather than the democratic, orderly and legal pathways detailed above. 
Previous efforts at power-sharing in Lebanon have collapsed into civil war and Burundi’s 
agreement is slowly unravelling into authoritarian rule and increased levels of violence, for 
example. 
External actors have played a role in facilitating, supporting, or even driving reform of 
consociationalism arrangements in deeply divided societies. This has been both a help and a 
hindrance in different contexts, especially if external actors’ actions are seen to favour one group. 
In Northern Ireland, for example, the British and Irish governments have supported the 
development of several key post-settlement agreements have streamlined and reformed the 
institutional process around the Good Friday Agreement (1998) in response to various power-
sharing crises. Heavy handed external governance by the Office of the High Commissioner in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina did drive reform but meant that local parties could avoid making 
decisions on contentious issues. In addition, the external efforts were perceived to favour one 
side and therefore failed to gain the political support needed. 
The second section of this report outlines several case studies of peace agreement 
consociationalism arrangements in Northern Ireland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lebanon, and 
Burundi which illustrate the various pathways away from consociationalism arrangements. None 
of these deeply divided countries has made a full democratic transition away from 
consociationalism yet, but reforms (and attempts at reforms) have been made to their 
consociationalism arrangements.         
2. Consociationalism  
Consociationalism, a leading form of power-sharing, has been used in violently divided societies 
as a means to end wars and build peace by aiming to ensure the widespread inclusion of all 
ethnopolitical groups in the processes of ‘executive, legislative, judicial, bureaucratic, military 
[and] cultural power’ (O’Leary, 2013, p. 4 in cited in McCulloch, 2017, p. 405, 407). It is a 
governance approach often ‘favoured by external actors for building state capacity and legitimacy 
in post-conflict societies’ (McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 216). McCulloch and McEvoy (2019, p. 
217) note that ‘power-sharing has been facilitated and even imposed by external actors in deeply 
divided societies ranging from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Iraq, Kenya, Lebanon, South 
Sudan to Macedonia and it has been recommended by external actors for Cyprus, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Nepal, and Syria’. Such support from external actors has 
‘gone beyond supporting the adoption of power-sharing to playing an integral role in its 
maintenance’ (McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 217). There are disagreements as to whether this 
role is a good thing or means these agreements are unable to be self-sustaining (McCulloch & 
McEvoy, 2019, p. 219).  
Consociationalism typically includes four key institutional arrangements outlined by Lijphart, the 
the leading authority on consociationalism: executive power-sharing (grand coalitions 
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representing different societal groups); proportionality rules in political representation; mutual 
vetoes, allowing communities to contest decisions against their interests; and group autonomy, 
or right to run their own affairs (McCulloch, 2017, p. 407; Fakhoury, 2019, p. 10). 
Consociationalism comes in two forms: liberal consociationalism, which ‘rewards whatever 
salient political identities emerge in democratic elections, whether these are based on ethnic or 
religious groups, or on subgroup or transgroup identities’ and corporate consociationalism, which 
‘accommodates groups according to ascriptive criteria, such as ethnicity or religion’ using quotas, 
reserved seats and other mechanisms (McGarry and O’Leary 2007, p. 675 cited in McCulloch, 
2017, p. 407; McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 218). Benefits such as autonomy, parity of esteem, 
inclusion and inter-community cooperation are thought more likely to accrue under a liberal 
consociational arrangement (McCulloch, 2017, p. 407). 
However, many of the societies where consociationalism has been used as part of the peace 
process, have ‘struggled to implement their power-sharing agreements, to consolidate a 
sustainable peace, and to move to a more ‘normal’ (i.e., majoritarian) form of democracy’ 
(McCulloch, 2017, p. 405; see also Fakhoury, 2019, p. 20). Many of these countries have been 
affected by periods of ‘immobilisation, elite intransigence and recurring political crises’, that have 
often only resolved through external engagement (McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 217). Critics of 
consociationalism argue that it can obstruct longer-term goals of peacebuilding and 
democratisation by locking in divisive identities as a basis of governance at the moment when 
they are at their most acrimonious, which makes them ‘prone to instability, intransigence and 
collapse’ (McCulloch, 2017, p. 406, 407; see also Fakhoury, 2019, p. 20). It has been suggested 
that consociationalism is a ‘temporary device without an exit’ and that because it does not lend 
itself to renegotiation it is prone to ‘stickiness’, which makes the transition to more ‘normal’ 
politics very difficult (McCulloch, 2017, p. 406-408).  
McCulloch (2017, p. 406, 408-409) also notes that concerns about exiting consociationalism 
have not been helped by power-sharing advocates who have not yet ‘effectively theorised the 
appropriate time at which to initiate the transition to a new arrangement, how the process might 
unfold and what the new arrangement might look like’.   
Pathways from consociationalism in deeply divided societies 
McCulloch (2017, p. 406) presents a typology of three non-violent pathways from power-sharing, 
that proceed on a ‘democratic, orderly, and legal basis’. Which pathway suits a divided society 
may differ depending on its circumstances and as realities on the ground are often complex and 
multi-faceted, they may not ‘always fit neatly into the categories as identified’ (McCulloch, 2017, 
p. 409). McCulloch (2017, p. 409) argues that empirical examples show that while transitions 
from consociationalism are difficult, they are not impossible. Their success is contingent on 
timing and context (McCulloch, 2017, p. 419). There is no ideal pathway out of power-sharing but 
McCulloch (2017, p. 419) suggests that, of the approaches she outlines, ‘constitutional tinkering’, 
or politically initiated constitutional reforms and adjustments to the original agreement over time, 
may be the most promising. 
A. Power-sharing dissolution via politically initiated constitutional reforms 
One pathway from power-sharing identified by McCulloch (2017, p. 415) is through a process of 
institutional reform. An example of this can be seen in the case study of Northern Ireland in 
Section 3 below. These reforms, driven by local political actors (sometimes supported by external 
actors) can either be ‘wholesale (i.e., the establishment of a constitutional review commission 
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and the intentional replacement of power- sharing with some other constitutional dispensation) or 
they can be marked by a piecemeal attempt, a kind of institutional ‘tinkering’ that, over time, 
renders power-sharing obsolete’ (McCulloch, 2017, p. 416). The intent behind reform can vary 
and more wholesale revisions tend to arise when there is ‘both consensus between major parties 
that the time for power-sharing has lapsed and sufficient trust between them to reopen the 
settlement and reach a new agreement’ (McCulloch, 2017, p. 416). More incremental reform can 
also be intentional (particularly in conjunction with aspirational clauses in agreements), or they 
can be the result of ‘ad hoc attempts to streamline institutional functionality’ (McCulloch, 2017, p. 
416).  
For attempts at wholesale reform to be successful ‘all major players must recognise the need for 
a new institutional configuration and be more or less on the same page about what that new 
arrangement entails and whether it can be sustained’ (McCulloch, 2017, p. 416). However, these 
conditions are generally rare in deeply divided societies and opening up the constitutional 
framework ‘can breed uncertainty and anxiety, particularly if minority guarantees are at stake’ 
(McCulloch, 2017, p. 417). The whole system could be thrown into turmoil if such talks fail 
(McCulloch, 2017, p. 416).     
As well as arising from emerging consensus on the need for reforms, attempts at wholesale or 
incremental reform may be the result of acute crisis moments, where the viability of existing 
arrangements is called into question (McCulloch, 2017, p. 416). Crisis moments can come from 
below, for example as a result of protest movements, or from above, as with the 2017 renewable 
energy heating scheme scandal in Northern Ireland which led to the collapse of power-sharing 
(McCulloch, 2017, p. 416). Such crises can heighten tensions, resurface underlying grievances, 
and ‘disagreements not related to the conflict may become ethnicised and parties are often ill-
disposed to compromise’ (McCulloch, 2017, p. 416).  
However, crisis moments may also provide the opportunity for incremental reforms, as has 
occurred in Northern Ireland (McCulloch, 2017, p. 417). An incrementalistic approach ‘provides 
an opportunity to flesh out the details of the original peace deal, which itself may have been 
intentionally vague in order to reach agreement’ (McCulloch, 2017, p. 417). Post settlement 
negotiations can improve or finetune a working agreement, salvage an eroding one, deal with 
specific shortcomings or an obsolete arrangement, and address any unanticipated 
consequences of the original pact (McCulloch, 2017, p. 417). This may take place during ad hoc, 
high-level all-party talks, often mediated by external actors, convened in response to power-
sharing deadlock (McCulloch, 2017, p. 417). Ongoing talks can also ‘help to routinise dialogue 
with the other side, thereby facilitating the ‘spirit of accommodation’ needed for power-sharing to 
work, reminding parties that they are capable of cooperation’ (McCulloch, 2017, p. 418). This can 
lessen groups existential anxieties (McCulloch, 2017, p. 418). McCulloch (2017, p. 418) notes 
that post-agreement mediation and arbitration ‘give existing parties a continued stake in the 
system while also widening the basis of participation for new parties to join the process’. 
However, there is a risk that the process can stall over time and of constitutional fatigue 
(McCulloch, 2017, p. 418). 
B. Power-sharing dissolution via judicial interventions 
Judicial interventions are another pathway from power-sharing identified by McCulloch (2017, p. 
413) and are ‘often advocated by those who may be discomfited by the potential legal 
ramifications of consociationalism’s emphasis on group rights – which they see as in conflict with 
robust individual rights protections’. Such interventions may come from international law or from 
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domestic courts willing to tackle the terms of the power-sharing agreement (McCulloch, 2017, p. 
413).  
However, the record of courts as unwinders of ethnic political bargains is mixed (McCulloch, 
2017, p. 413). International courts have ruled against consociational arrangements (for example 
in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina seen below in Section 3) but have also propped them up 
(for example in the case of Belgium) (McCulloch, 2017, p. 413). They have the ‘potential to 
loosen sticky rules, or can at least get the process of reform on the agenda, and may ‘unwind the 
political settlement more gently’ than political actors’ (Sapiano, 2017, p. 164 cited in McCulloch, 
2017, p. 413).  
However, McCulloch (2017, p. 414) notes some areas of concern in relation to international 
counts playing the role of unwinder of power-sharing arrangements. They may ‘miss key local 
contextual factors, and may not understand or appreciate why it was that consociationalism was 
adopted in the first place’ or ‘get the timing of the transition wrong, pushing society away from 
power-sharing before it is ready, thereby regressing any gains made in terms of political stability’ 
(McCulloch, 2017, p. 414). In addition, local politicians may not comply with the proposed 
reforms of the international court, which has the potential to undermine the court’s legitimacy 
(McCulloch, 2017, p. 414). In addition, while the intention of such rulings may be to ease the 
country away from rigid power- sharing and any constraints on human rights, by ruling against 
the agreement it could be seen as ‘confirming the illegitimacy of the existing political 
arrangement’ and have the ‘unintended consequence of undermining the pursuit of a multiethnic 
state by reinforcing the notion that the state itself is illegitimate’ (McCulloch, 2017, p. 414). 
Domestic constitutional courts, where they are, or at least appear to be, sufficiently impartial and 
independent with respect to rival ethno-political factions, are suggested as a potential solution 
(McCulloch, 2017, p. 415). The domestic courts have a firm understanding of local complexities 
and are not subject to public opinion in the same way as politicians, which means ‘they may be 
able to make the difficult choices that politicians are hesitant to undertake’ (McCulloch, 2017, p. 
415). However, in some cases they may choose to uphold power-sharing, rather than set up the 
conditions to move away from it – see section on Bosnia and Herzegovina below (McCulloch, 
2017, p. 415). 
McCulloch (2017, p. 415) notes that while courts may help to ‘get the ball rolling’, ‘their success 
remains dependent on the political will to undertake the necessary institutional reforms’ as 
constitutional courts cannot create new laws. Politicians may be ‘reluctant to undertake such 
reforms, either because it risks jeopardising their own political standing or because they worry 
about the relative gains made by other groups during such negotiations’ (McCulloch, 2017, p. 
415).  
C. Power-sharing adoption on an interim basis 
Another pathway out of power-sharing is to establish that the arrangement is temporary from the 
beginning (McCulloch, 2017, p. 410). However, the exit of interim power-sharing arrangements is 
not always well signposted (McCulloch, 2017, p. 410).  
Sometimes there is an aspirational claim to transition, with an understanding that the goal is to 
move beyond power-sharing but the timeline or procedures for doing so are not specified 
(McCulloch, 2017, p. 410). The ‘how’ of transition beyond power-sharing is left to future political 
actors (McCulloch, 2017, p. 410). A benefit of this is that it allows parties to collectively articulate 
the speed of the transition, and this consensus can help bolster the odds of a successful 
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transition (McCulloch, 2017, p. 410). A temporary power-sharing agreement can ‘allow parties to 
defer particularly difficult and contentious issues to a later date when the stakes are not as high’ 
(McCulloch, 2017, p. 410). However, without a specified end date to the agreement there may be 
little incentive or motivation to change the arrangement, especially if political elites benefit from 
the status quo (McCulloch, 2017, p. 410). 
Another alternative is to have a binding timeline or sunset clause (an end date), ‘at which point 
the parties can either choose to renew the agreement for another set period of time or they can 
choose to shift to a new arrangement’ (McCulloch, 2017, p. 411)1. The power-sharing agreement 
in post-apartheid South Africa is an example where this occurred, although it was not a fully 
consociational configuration due to lacking mutual-veto rights (McCulloch, 2017, p. 411). 
McCulloch (2017, p. 411) notes that sunset clauses can ‘get parties through the vast uncertainty 
and mistrust that characterises the immediate post-war period; they provide a period of 
confidence-building between distrustful actors, and in asymmetrical relations, they can represent 
a gesture of goodwill on part of the dominant group’. In addition, they ‘avoid locking any single 
party into power permanently’ (McCulloch, 2017, p. 411).  
However, they may also contribute to instability as the deadline for the agreement to expire may 
make parties nervous about their place in the new system (especially minorities) and could lead 
to renewed violence (McCulloch, 2017, p. 411-412, 419). This is especially the case if the sunset 
clause does not provide enough time to instil norms of cooperation between the parties 
(McCulloch, 2017, p. 412).  
Collapse of power-sharing arrangements  
McCulloch (2017, p. 419) notes that while there are democratic pathways from power-sharing, as 
detailed above, ‘a dominant pathway from power-sharing is simply through the collapse of the 
arrangement’. In Cyprus, for example, a three-year experiment in power-sharing ended in 
deadlock, a coup d’état, an invasion by Turkey and the de facto partitioning of the country 
(McCulloch, 2017, p. 419). A prior informal power-sharing arrangement in Lebanon was ended 
by the civil war in 1975 (McCulloch, 2017, p. 419). Burundi’s power-sharing agreement has 
slowly unravelled, alongside a consolidation of authoritarian rule and an increase in levels of 
violence – see Section 3 below for more details (McCulloch, 2017, p. 419; Vandeginste, 2017). 
However, in all these cases, the countries have previously experienced, returned to, or power-
sharing remains the dominant proposed solution to resolving the crisis (McCulloch, 2017, p. 419).  
Thus McCulloch (2017, p. 406, 230) suggests that perhaps consociationalism may be beneficial 
as an enduring institutional fixture rather than viewed as a transitional device. It is often adopted 
to deal with a ‘demographic configuration ill-suited to majoritarian rules’ and attempts to move 
towards majoritarianism are not likely to induce ‘normal’ politics but be more likely to retrigger 
mistrust and exclusion (McCulloch, 2017, p. 420). A well-designed power-sharing arrangement, 
on the other hand ‘not only contributes to political stability, it can also ensure minority inclusion 
                                                   
1 McCulloch (2017, p. 412) also mentions emergency power-sharing pacts, which are an increasingly common 
strategy designed to quell electoral violence, as an interim power-sharing arrangement, although they generally 
do not introduce full consociationalism. Used in places like Kenya and Zimbabwe, they have been designed to 
stop violence that follows from disputed election results and are intended as a holding arrangement (McCulloch, 
2017, p. 412). They ‘come with significant risks, including the fact that they trade effective governance for short-
term stability’ (McCulloch, 2017, p. 412).  
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and democratic politics for all groups’ (McCulloch, 2017, p. 420). However, McCulloch (2017, p. 
420) notes that it is important that power-sharing agreements are able to incorporate small-scale 
changes over time as contexts change, which is ‘likely to entail a liberal form of power-sharing 
instead of a corporate consociation’ (McCulloch, 2017, p. 420). 
The role of external actors in supporting constitutional reform 
External actors have played a role in power-sharing transitions and political reforms (as well as in 
supporting power-sharing) (McCulloch, 2017, p. 418; McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019). This can be 
done in a ‘direct fashion through conditionality measures (e.g., constitutional reform requirements 
for EU accession) or through an arbitration process’ (McCulloch, 2017, p. 418). They may act as 
facilitators and convene interparty negotiations, provide technical expertise on institutional 
reform, or draft the text of an agreement (McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 222). Their approach 
may be ‘light touch’ or heavy handed’ (McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019). Examples include Northern 
Ireland and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which can be seen in Section 3 below.  
A light touch strategy of convening talks and proposing measures to resolve power-sharing 
crises can enable the process to continue, provide stability, and make progress when parties are 
ready to resolve issues (McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 226). However, if their engagement 
appears too light, and is ‘perceived as detached and indifferent, they risk alienating groups and 
even signalling to elites that their intentions to thwart power-sharing in the interests of their own 
group will remain unchecked’ (McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 227). Parties may choose to walk 
away from talks and blame their opponents or external actors for the lack of progress, or feel that 
external actors detached and indifferent approach favours one party, resulting in inter-party 
relations deteriorating (McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 226). A lot depends on parties willingness 
to cooperate, and if they choose to renege on their commitments, external actors are faced with 
the ‘difficult decision of whether to re-engage with another ‘light touch’ effort or adopt a more 
heavy-handed approach to address power-sharing instability’ (McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 
227).  
A more heavy-handed approach by external actors tends to involve more assertive or coercive 
measures, as external actors move ‘beyond facilitating talks as a way to overcome stalemate to 
imposing a decision on the power-sharing institutions or dictating the way forward’ (McCulloch & 
McEvoy, 2019, p. 227). This more assertive approach, especially if it is seen to favour one group 
over another, can have complex or difficult consequences (McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 227). 
‘Promoting self-government and local ownership via heavy-handed measures has an adverse 
impact on the political institutions and inter-communal relations’ (McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 
229).  
McCulloch and McEvoy (2019, p. 230) suggest that external actors could continue to support 
power-sharing stability while also supporting local actors as they ‘go it alone’ through two broad 
strategies of ‘designing a set of ‘living’ power-sharing institutions and building in deadlock-
breaking mechanisms at the outset’. The first strategy takes a ‘there’s always more talks’ 
approach to power-sharing practice, recognising that the moments in which the power-sharing 
agreements are negotiated are not necessarily ideal and that more may need to be discussed 
(McCulloch, 2019, p. 230). This becomes easier if corporate consociational rules are avoided as 
much as possible, as these rules tend to entrench ethnic positions and make cooperation 
difficult, and if the original peace agreement is not held up as the single definitive statement of 
inter-communal relations (McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 230). Cochrane et al (2018, p. 73 cited 
in McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 230) call this approach ‘living consociationalism’, which 
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involves a ‘combination of flexible procedures for institutional reforms with extensive sets of 
institutional incentives for cooperation’. The second strategy suggests that building robust 
dispute resolution/mediation processes into the initial agreement, which may be facilitated by 
external actors, would help in situations where political elites have not been inclined to cooperate 
with each other (McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 231).  
3. Country case studies  
A few examples of deeply divided societies that are taking various pathways from 
consociationalism are detailed below. They are at different stages in their pathways away from, 
or in refining, their consociationalism arrangements, although the factors affecting these reforms 
and their impacts are not always clearly set out in the available literature.   
Northern Ireland – politically initiated reforms  
Northern Ireland has features of liberal consociation and is an example where an incrementalism 
approach has occurred (McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 218; McCulloch, 2017, p. 417). There 
have been five key post-settlement agreements that have streamlined the institutional process 
around the Good Friday Agreement (1998) (McCulloch, 2017, p. 417). These agreements have 
been brokered by the British and Irish governments, who are co-guarantors of the Good Friday 
Agreement, and have been key to keeping power-sharing on track (McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, 
p. 216). At times, though, the British government has taken a more heavy-handed approach, 
which has not always been helpful to relations between the parties involved (McVulloch & 
McEvoy, 2019, p. 227-228, 230).   
The 2006 St Andrews Agreement, for example, altered the rules for the election of the First 
Minister (FM) and deputy First Minister (dFM) so that the previous contentious strategy requiring 
inter-ethnic rivals to support candidates from the other side was replaced by the FM now coming 
from the party with the largest seat share in the Assembly and the dFM coming from the largest 
party in the largest national designation other than the FM’s (McCulloch, 2017, p. 417). It was 
drafted by the British and Irish governments, who convened inter-party talks (McCulloch & 
McEvoy, 2019, p. 222). The 2010 ‘Hillsborough Agreement devolved justice and policing to the 
region and the 2014 Stormont House Agreement set out principles for dealing with the 
contentious issues of welfare reform, parades and flags, and recommendations on an overall 
reduction in the number of [Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs)] elected to the Northern 
Ireland Assembly’ (McCulloch, 2017, p. 417; McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 223). New talks in 
late 2015 when the agreement failed to be effectively implemented lead to the Fresh Start 
Agreement, which addressed the functionality of the Northern Ireland Assembly ‘through the 
reduction of the total number of executive portfolios and seats in the Assembly (from 108 to 90), 
the creation of an official opposition and restructuring the Petition of Concern, a kind of veto right 
in place for the region’s two communities’ (McCulloch, 2017, p. 417). The creation of an official 
opposition ‘incentivises a kind of combativeness more closely associated with majoritarian 
government and opposition style politics’, although the government-and-opposition arrangement 
stalled with the failure of the DUP and Sinn Féin to agree to a new Programme for Government 
after the snap 2017 elections (McCulloch, 2017, p. 418).  
These agreements were not intended to move away from power-sharing but to refine and 
streamline the power-sharing institutions, making them more efficient (McCulloch, 2017, p. 417). 
One official suggested that each crisis and the response has resulted in issues being addressed 
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and put away (McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 221). McCulloch (2017, p. 418) suggests that 
these examples indicate that power-sharing agreements are not inherently ‘sticky’ and that this 
kind of tinkering over a long period of time can add up to big changes. However, not all parties 
support this talks strategy and they have been accused of resulting in politics that ‘perpetually 
exists in the realm of high-stakes crisis mediation, not in the everyday business of ‘normal’ 
politics’ (McCulloch, 2017, p. 418).  
Despite these reforms, and subsequent elections and talks, power-sharing was suspended in 
2017 for three years as a result of a renewable heating energy scandal, marriage equality, an 
Irish language act, and Brexit, amongst other things (McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 216, 223-
224). Power-sharing has restarted this week (13th January 2020) with the support of the British 
and Irish governments, who drafted a New Decade New Approach deal to restart power-sharing 
and provided substantial sums to sweeten the deal (The Guardian, 2020). The governments 
have provided a compromise ‘whereby the rights of Irish speakers are balanced with rights for 
the Ulster Scots/loyalist tradition’ (McDonald, 2020). Unhappiness with the main parties had led 
to the loss of thousands of votes in the recent general election, which added to the pressure on 
the parties to return to devolution and power-sharing (McDonald, 2020).   
Bosnia and Herzegovina – judicial interventions 
The 1995 Dayton Accords ended war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and created the cooperate 
consociationalised political, governmental, and judicial structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Bell, 2018, p. 17). The power-sharing system put in place by Dayton has been criticised as 
flawed and is seen to be a major factor as to why the country has not moved on from ethnic 
discord (Bell, 2018, p. 17, 19-20). The different layers of power-sharing (local, cantonal, entity, 
and federal) can make it difficult to ‘accomplish a reform agenda’ (Bell, 2018, p. 20). Rice (2017, 
p. 9) notes that nearly every proposed resolution or amendment to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
consociationalism arrangement has failed, and there has been a lack of willingness by domestic 
actors to pursue reforms.  
Bosnia and Herzegovina is an example of consociationalism arrangement where attempts have 
been made to reform it through judicial interventions (McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 218). There 
have been three rulings against the consociationalism arrangement in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
at the European Court for Human Rights (Sejdić and Finci, Zornić and Pilav)2 (McCulloch, 2017, 
p. 413). In their judgement on Zornić, the court noted that the original constitutional arrangement 
was never meant to be permanent and concluded that ‘more than 18 years after the end of the 
tragic conflict, there could no longer be any reason for the contested constitutional provisions to 
be maintained’ (European Court of Human Rights 2014 cited in McCulloch, 2017, p. 413). 
However, these judgments against the Bosnian arrangement were not unanimous and the 
dissenting judge in the Sejdić case, noted that: ‘I, for my part, doubt that any state should be 
                                                   
2 ‘In Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina (2009) Jakob Finci and Dervo Sejdić, who are Jewish and 
Roma respectively, challenged the rules for election for the tripartite presidency and the House of Peoples at the 
European Court of Human Rights, alleging ethnic discrimination against ‘others’ (i.e., anyone who does not 
identify with the constituent peoples). In Zornić vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina, (2014) the court found that the rules 
on election to the presidency and House of Peoples discriminated against Azra Zornić who could not contest the 
elections because she was unwilling to declare an ethnic affiliation and instead identified as ‘a citizen of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina’. In Pilav vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina, the court also ruled that the presidential rules were 
discriminatory against Ilijaz Pilav, a Bosniak living in the Republika Srpska town of Srebrenica, who could not 
contest the presidential elections on the basis of his residence.’ (McCulloch, 2017, p. 421).  
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placed under any legal or ethical obligation to sabotage the very system that saved its 
democratic existence’ (European Court of Human Rights 2009, p. 56 cited in McCulloch, 2017, p. 
414). There is lack of local consensus on the reforms proposed by these judgements and they 
have not moved forward significantly since the judgements were made (Mcculloch, 2017, p. 414; 
Bell, 2018, p. 23).  
Other judicial interventions have extended the power-sharing arrangements in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (McCulloch, 2017, p. 415). In 2000, Bosnia’s Constitutional Court made the 
controversial ruling that the constitutions of both Entities had to extend ‘constituent peoples’ 
status to all three recognised groups (McCulloch, 2017, p. 415). This introduced reforms that 
would constitute the upper chambers of the two entities on the basis of parity (regardless of 
population) and mandated that government be formed on the basis of proportional 
representation, moving away from ethnic homogeneity in the Entities (McCulloch, 2017, p. 415). 
Other external efforts to reform the system 
A heavy-handed external governance approach was taken by the Office of the High 
Commissioner, which controversially had powers to ‘impose measures when the domestic 
parties are unable to agree and to take action against politicians and officials deemed ‘in 
violation’ of the agreement’ (McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 228; see also Rice, 2017, p. 9). 
These powers have been used to drive reform (McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 228). For 
example, a new rule was imposed that changed the number of representatives required to be 
present in order for the government to take decisions, which minimised the chronic absenteeism 
used by Ministers to block parliamentary decisions (Rice, 2017, p. 9). However, the use of these 
powers ‘created a problem of dependency on the part of the local parties, whereby they could 
avoid making decisions on contentious issues, knowing that the High Representative would 
eventually step in’ (McCulloch & McEvoy, 2018, p. 228). Having external governance reduced 
the incentives for local actors to compromise on contentious issues which deprived 
consociationalism of its positive inducement of elite cooperation and the development of unity 
and trust between them (McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 229; Rice, 2017, p. 9; Merdzanovic, 
2017, p. 34). In addition, the heavy-handed approach resulted in ‘the entrenchment of nationalist 
positions and regular standoffs between the High Representative and nationalist political parties, 
in particular, Bosnian Serbs’ (Juncos, 2012, p. 699 cited in McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 229). 
Such external intervention has meant that it could be argued that Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
consociationalism has not had the opportunity to start working properly, although it could also be 
argued that external intervention was needed to overcome both ‘the uncooperative behaviour of 
the domestic elites and the inadequate political structures’ (Merdzanovic, 2017, p. 34). 
Other external efforts have been made to introduce constitutional reforms, including those 
needed for prospective EU membership (McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 224; Bell, 2018, p. 23). 
External actors, even where they frame their engagement as support and facilitation, can be 
interpreted by internal actors as imposing and interfering (McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 227). 
The EU’s fairly strict reform parameters which have led to a push for stronger central institutions, 
have mobilised secessionist sentiment, fanned power struggles and undermined reform 
(McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 227). Attempts to pass these reforms, such as the 2006 ‘April 
package’ and the ‘Butmir process’, failed to get the domestic political support needed (McCulloch 
& McEvoy, 2019, p. 224-225; Bell, 2018, p. 23-24; Rice, 2017, p. 10). The ‘perception of Bosnian 
Serbs that constitutional reform was intended to favour the Bosniak position via centralization 
has shaped the process in zero-sum terms’ (McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 226). Ethnic 
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nationalism has fuelled the political culture in the country, creating a hostile environment for the 
ideals of consociationalism (Rice, 2017, p. 10). Bell (2018, p. 20) also argues that one of the key 
reasons constitutional reform has not progressed in Bosnia and Herzegovina is that ‘political 
elites are seemingly unwilling to compromise in scenarios where they will lose power and control 
over some territory’. In addition, none of the main parties share a common vision, which make 
working towards constitutional change harder (Bell, 2018, p. 26). It was hoped that working 
towards EU membership could be a common goal for the country’s leaders, but this has not been 
the case (Bell, 2018, p. 39). In addition, some argue that ‘there has been limited public support 
for constitutional reform as everyday citizens do not necessarily see how this impacts their daily 
lives’ and for many people, the current structure represents stability (Bell, 2018, p. 41). 
However, the lack of improvement in inter-party relations which followed the failed ‘Butmir 
process’ and dissatisfaction with government inactivity fed into a series of political protests in 
2013 and 2014 organized by civil society, the so-called Baby revolution’ (‘Bebolucija’) and 
‘plenum movement’ (McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 225; Merdzanovic, 2017, p. 34). People took 
to the streets to ‘voice opposition against patronage networks, a political elite uninterested in 
social welfare, and a political system that neither works for their interests nor manages to 
produce socially acceptable results’ (Merdzanovic, 2017, p. 34). Merdzanovic (2017, p. 34) notes 
that it remains to be seen what effect these political protests will have in the long term.  
Rice (2017, p. 11) notes that attempts at reform have not addressed ‘underlying issues of distrust 
and disunity between Serbian, Muslim, and Croatian political elites’ which she suggests has 
ultimately ‘prevented the development of cross-cutting state loyalties and resulted in the failure of 
consociationalism’. Subsequent external efforts focused on ‘socio-economic reform and putting 
constitutional reform on the back burner for the time being’, with the idea that constitutional 
reform will come over time as parties become more cooperative (McCulloch & McEvoy, 2019, p. 
225).  
Lebanon – interim arrangements 
Lebanon has a history of both formal and informal consociational arrangements (Bogaards, 
2019, p. 27). Fakhoury (2019, p. 11) notes ‘three core dilemmas that have recurred in Lebanon’s 
political transition: the power-sharing formula’s proneness to deadlock, its dependence on the 
external environment as an avenue for partisanship and sectarian leverage, and its weak 
responsiveness to demands from below’, strongly linked to the politics of sectarianism.  
Lebanon’s consociational arrangements have been criticised for their inflexibility and the seeming 
impossibility of change (Bogaards, 2019, p. 28). However Bogaards (2019, p. 28) notes that the 
main difficulty lies with ‘reforming the country’s informal institutions’ rather than the rigid 
constitution. He argues that it is the informal nature of the understanding between the country’s 
leading communities that the most powerful national offices are allocated to designated 
denominations that makes it so hard to change (Bogaards, 2019, p. 28, 35). Over time there has 
been a tendency for informal consociational institutions in Lebanon to become formal (Bogaards, 
2019, p. 37).  
The Ta’if Agreement of 1989, a peace agreement ending the civil war, is an example of an 
aspirational pathway away from consociationalism (McCulloch, 2017, p. 410). Rosiny (2015 cited 
in McCulloch, 2017, p. 410) notes that the ‘Ta’if Agreement was designed as transitory. However, 
he argues that part of the reason it has failed to move past the consociational stage is because 
‘the signatories underestimated the need for a clear roadmap that would also have been 
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compelling for those politicians who were elected later and did not participate in drafting the 
agreement’ (Rosiny, 2015, p. 498 cited in McCulloch, 2017, p. 410; see also Bogaards, 2019, p. 
37). Most of the consociational features have been constitutionalised, which suggests change 
needs to come from parliament to reform it (Bogaards, 2019, p. 37). However, ‘ethnic 
entrepreneurs’, have been blamed for the failed transition, and therefore advocates of change 
might need to look beyond parliament toward the leaders of the various ethnic communities 
(Bogaards, 2019, p. 37). 
A variety of crises have developed since the Ta’if Agreement. The Doha Agreement of 2008, 
which was intended to stop violence, end the political crisis between the anti-Syrian majority and 
Hezbollah, and restore order in Lebanon, involved foreign mediation (Bogaards, 2019, p. 32; 
Machnouck, 2018, p. 5). It helped to ‘settle a dispute about the drawing of electoral districts and 
provided for an interim government of national unity’ and was felt by some to be a ‘weakening of 
parliament, limiting majoritarian rule, and overall deepening consociationalism’ (Bogaards, 2019, 
p. 32). However, since 2011, cabinets have collapsed, others have been on the verge of 
breakdown, and elections have been postponed (Fakhoury, 2019, p. 12).  
Efforts to reform and actual reforms have occurred during this time. During the term of the former 
Prime Minister, Taman Salam, he attempted to loosen the dominance of sectarian identities over 
the cabinet by proposing that ministers rotate so that there was not a sectarian grip over certain 
ministries, and held negotiations with a goal of introducing a deadlock-breaking mechanism  
(Fakhoury, 2019, p. 13). Electoral law reforms had to balance a number of different objectives to 
try and ensure ‘both proper communal representation and national integration within a 
democratic environment’ (Machnouk, 2018, p. 14). In 2017 a new electoral law was passed 
which ‘reduced the number of Lebanon’s districts, introduced proportional representation (PR), 
and sought to promote cross-cutting allegiances through the introduction of a preferential vote’ 
(Fakhoury, 2019, p. 13). Some felt that the law ‘allowed voters to strongly identify with their 
representatives’, while others felt that ‘it empowered sectarian allegiances at the expense of 
national unity’ (Fakhoury, 2019, p. 13). Machnouk (2018, p. 2) notes that electoral reforms are 
seen as the ‘the single most important institutional reform’ in consociational regimes, as they 
shape behavioural incentives for candidates. The 2018 elections led to moderate political shifts in 
the parliament but led to a period of high sectarian fragmentation, and inter- and intra-sectarian 
struggles over the distribution of strategic ministerial portfolios (Fakhoury, 2019, p. 13-14). This 
sectarian elite wrangling, has contributed to inefficient governance and deterioration of public 
services (Fakhoury, 2019, p. 14). 
A number of incidents, such as the 2013 Tomato Revolution protests and the 2015 trash crisis 
protests indicate how ‘the power-sharing formula has poorly responded to calls for reforms and to 
the citizenry’s grievances’ (Fakhoury, 2019, p. 18). A factor in the demobilisation of these 
protests was sectarian leaders crafting of a ‘counter narrative that the movement threatened civil 
peace and undermined Lebanon’s precarious stability’ (Fakhoury, 2019, p. 18). Political leaders 
have been especially reluctant to reform laws which ‘may erode the religio-political model on 
which Lebanon’s power-sharing is built, despite lobbying by civil society’ (Fakhoury, 2019, p. 18). 
Lack of responsiveness to pass laws to address citizens’ concerns in relation to areas such as 
health, water, or employment, has resulted in a sharp decline in citizens’ satisfaction with the 
performance of the political system (Fakhoury, 2019, p. 19). Fakhoury (2019, p. 19) argues that 
Lebanon’s system’s ‘focus on sectarian representation hampers nonsectarian forms of 
mobilization and weakens politicians’ interest in citizens’ concerns’. 
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A variety of proposals for constitutional reform exist, including those which seek to improve the 
functioning of the consociational system (Bogaards, 2019, p. 35). The proposal for a referendum 
mechanism to settle major issues ‘could make the decision making more majoritarian, depending 
on how it is done’ (Bogaards, 2019, p. 35). 
Burundi – (attempted) de-consociationalism  
The 2000 Arusha agreement marked the end of ethnic civil war in Burundi with a consociational 
power-sharing arrangement (Vandeginste, 2017, p. 7). A major achievement of the agreement 
was felt to be the ‘de-ethnicization of political competition’ (Vandeginste, 2017, p. 7). However, 
Vandeginste (2017, p. 6) details how Burundi’s consociational power-sharing arrangement came 
under increasing threat, against a wider background of democratic backsliding towards a de facto 
one party state.  
A variety of factors, including structural features and elite choices, contribute to the ‘(attempted) 
end of consociationalism in Burundi’ (Vandeginste, 2017, p. 6). Weaknesses in the 
consociational arrangement itself, such as where rules were not clearly formulated, became a 
problem in the climate of distrust that has prevailed since the 2015 political crisis (Vandeginste, 
2017, p. 7). Vandeginste (2017, p. 8) also suggests that consociational arrangements may 
decline if ‘their institutional set-up does not match (or no longer matches) with the underlying 
social groups and divisions and their political relevance’, as then ‘maintaining the consociational 
status-quo risks being out of phase with social realities’. As the political salience of ethnicity 
seems to be declining, this could be a factor (Vandeginste, 2017, p. 8). Some parties in Burundi 
have increasingly questioned the legitimacy of the Arusha peace process, making the case that 
the current consociational institutions are illegitimate as well (Vandeginste, 2017, p. 9). The main 
objections come from a party who were absent during the peace negotiations (Vandeginste, 
2017, p. 9). Post-conflict elections in Burundi have promoted autocratisation and undermined 
power-sharing, with the three post conflict elections fundamentally altering Burundi’s political 
landscape compared to the political context at the time of the Arusha Agreement (Vandeginste, 
2017, p. 10). International engagement with the process has also waned, and international actors 
have generally been vague about what they expect from respect for the Arusha Agreement 
(Vandeginste, 2017, p. 11). The consociational power-sharing arrangements have been 
‘informally altered (evaded, eroded and hijacked)’ and Vandeginste (2017, p. 12) suggests that 
unilateral initiatives to ‘amend the constitution might well be the formalisation of an informal 
degradation process’ by the ruling party, which is not in favour of the Arusha Agreement. 
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